Unity 2.0: Secure and Durable Personal Cloud Storage by Kim, Beom Heyn et al.
Unity 2.0: Secure and Durable Personal Cloud Storage
Beom Heyn Kim, Wei Huang, Afshar Ganjali, David Lie
University of Toronto
Abstract
While personal cloud storage services such as Dropbox,
OneDrive, Google Drive and iCloud have become very
popular in recent years, these services offer few secu-
rity guarantees to users. These cloud services are aimed
at end users, whose applications often assume a local file
system storage, and thus require strongly consistent data.
In addition, users usually access these services using per-
sonal computers and portable devices such as phones and
tablets, which are upload bandwidth constrained and in
many cases battery powered. Unity is a system that pro-
vides confidentiality, integrity, durability and strong con-
sistency while minimizing the upload bandwidth of its
clients. We find that Unity consumes minimal upload
bandwidth for compute-heavy workload compared to
NFS and Dropbox, while uses similar amount of upload
bandwidth for write-heavy workload relative to NBD.
Although read-heavy workload tends to consume more
upload bandwidth with Unity, it is no more than an eighth
of the size of blocks replicated and there is much room
for optimization. Moreover, Unity provides flexibility to
maintain multiple DEs to provide scalability for multiple
devices to concurrently access the data with the minimal
lease switch cost.
1 Introduction
A large number of personal cloud storage options, such
as Dropbox, OneDrive, Google Drive, iCloud, Box, Sug-
arsync and SpiderOak exist today. These services con-
sist of an online storage server and automatic synchro-
nization software that mirrors some or all of the files
the user has stored in the cloud to the user’s devices.
These services have millions of users who entrust their
valuable data to these providers. Unfortunately, the user
must trust the cloud provider with the security of their
data. While users may encrypt data before uploading it
to the cloud, this only guarantees confidentiality – the
integrity and durability of the data stored in the cloud
is still in the hands of the cloud provider. For example,
the cloud provider could silently corrupt user data, and
the corrupted files would be automatically replicated to
all user devices replacing any trace of the correct data.
Even worse, a malicious or faulty cloud provider could
delete or destroy files, causing the affected files to also
be deleted on all the user’s devices.
In this paper, we describe the design and implemen-
tation of Unity a system that protects the security and
durability of data stored in the cloud. While recent
work [6, 15, 19] has addressed the problem for untrusted
cloud storage. Like previous systems, Unity encrypts
data before storing on the cloud to protect confidential-
ity and replicates blocks over the user’s devices to en-
sure durability. However, Unity differs from previous
solutions in two ways. First, the previous proposals do
not protect against an adversary that weakens the consis-
tency of data stored in the cloud and instead require on
the application layer to deal with weakly consistent data.
Because Unity is designed for personal cloud storage, we
assume all client devices are used by a single user, and
thus design Unity around the notion that concurrent ac-
cess by different devices to the same object is rare and
does not have to be fast. Moreover, many of the end-user
applications users use to access files stored in a personal
cloud were designed around a local file system and thus
may require some level of consistency. As a result, in
designing Unity, we opted to enforce strong consistency
in the face of failures and even against a malicious adver-
sary [22]. Unity enforces consistency at the granularity
of a storage abstraction we call a data entity (DE). DEs
can be mapped to various application-level storage ob-
jects, such as files or an entire file system, thus allowing
the system designer to pick different points in the trade-
off between performance, scalability and consistency.
Second, users tend to access personal cloud services
from devices that have upload bandwidth-constrained
network connections. To detect server equivocation, in-
dividual devices must communicate directly with each
other to prevent the server from hiding the writes of one
device from another [14]. However, excessive commu-
nication between devices depletes this limited upload
bandwidth. For example, the authors of Depot report
that gossiping to detect server equivocation increases
the bandwidth requirements of writes by approximately
50% [15]. Unity’s strong consistency allows it to min-
imize inter-device communication because the order of
writes across devices is well-defined. As a result, de-
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vices need only directly communicate when the writer of
a DE changes or to check whether a device has failed or
not.
Our main result is demonstrating that an alternative
“contract” is viable between an individual user and the
cloud storage provider. The standard relationship has had
the user pay the cloud provider for the durability and se-
curity of their data. However, we observe that the most
difficult properties for an end user to achieve are avail-
ability and high upload bandwidth for their devices. User
devices are on networks that may fail intermittently or
the devices themselves may crash or run out of battery.
Similarly, high upload bandwidth connections are expen-
sive and can rapidly consume a device’s limited battery.
On the other hand, users have increasing numbers of per-
sonal devices and those devices have had increasingly
larger and larger local storage. As a result, it is becom-
ing easier for the user to replicate and provide durability
for data themselves. Unity proposes a new relationship
where security and durability are provided by the user
and the cloud provider provides availability of the data
and network bandwidth to quickly replicate the data.
This paper makes the following contributions:
1. We describe the design and implementation of
Unity a system that uses a cloud provider’s avail-
ability and network bandwidth to efficiently provide
security and durability for personal data stored in
the cloud.
2. We compare the performance and bandwidth uti-
lization of Unity against centralized server solutions
such as NFS and NBD, as well as existing cloud
solutions such as Dropbox. Unity could perform
comparably to NFS, NBD and Dropbox. Also, we
shows potentially there can be large upload band-
width consumption saving over various networks
using Unity.
3. We study how the DE abstraction can be mapped to
a coarse-grain storage unit such as an entire file sys-
tem or to fine-grain storage units such as individual
files on a modified version of the Minix file sys-
tem. We also measure the trade-off between the im-
proved performance of fine-grain DE mappings due
to less false sharing and the higher book-keeping
costs and overhead introduced by the management
of the larger number of mappings.
We present the architecture overview of Unity in the
Section 2. In the Section 3, core data structures, Unity
interface and the various component of our current Unity
prototype are described in detail. Evaluation results are
described in the Section 4 followed by the related work
summary in the Section 5. At last, we conclude the paper
with the section 6.
2 Overview
We begin by describing the basic components of Unity
and give a simplified description of the protocol it uses.
We then enhance this protocol to provide durability, en-
force security and deal with failures.
2.1 Basic system architecture
A Unity cloud consists of several user-controlled devices
and a cloud storage provider who provides the storage
service. The cloud provider itself consists of two sub-
components – a coordinator and a cloud storage node,
which we will refer to simply as the cloud node for
brevity. All user devices send regular heartbeat messages
to the coordinator so that the coordinator can detect if a
device has failed or lost network connection.
Data stored in the cloud consists of fixed-sized blocks
of data and are grouped into units called Data Entities
(DE), which are the basic unit of consistency in Unity.
Only one user device may read or write blocks stored in
each DE at any given time. To do so, the device must
first obtain a lease from the coordinator. Once obtained,
a correctly working user device does not actively give up
a lease on a DE – it only give it up when another user de-
vice requests a lease for the same DE or it may lose the
lease if it fails to send a heartbeat. Our current implemen-
tation of Unity provides strong consistency by requiring
the exclusive lease for both reads and writes. By only
requiring a lease for writing instead of both writing and
reading, Unity can also provide sequential consistency
for better performance.
Each DE is an array of blocks and each data block
has a unique index within the DE. In addition, writes to
blocks in the DE are versioned and the cloud node and
user devices may store various block-versions from DEs.
A correctly functioning cloud node will maintain storage
for every block-version of every DE necessary to create
a consistent image of each DE, while user devices may
each store subsets of these block-versions to enable re-
covery against a malicious or failed cloud provider. User
devices can request a block stored on the cloud node by
sending a block request that specifies the DE, block index
and version of the desired block.
When the lease-holder for a DE writes a block, it cre-
ates a write update message, which contains the DE,
block index, a version number and a hash of the block
contents. The lease-holder buffers write updates and the
new block contents and periodically flushes the write up-
dates to the coordinator and the block contents to the
cloud node. The coordinator records all such write up-
dates in an append-only log for each DE, which we call
the state of the DE. Devices can request a copy of this
log at any time from the coordinator using a state fetch
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Message Participants Description
State fetch Device→CR Device requests all state updates for a DE starting at a particular sequence
number.
Block request Device→CN Device requests contents of a block-version. Cloud node will respond with
appropriate block contents.
Write update LH→CR&CN Lease-holder sends a new block-version to the coordinator and cloud node.
The update must signed and include a sequence number. Block contents must
be encrypted.
LH-switch Device→CR Device requests the lease for a DE.
LH-revocation CR→LH Coordinator requests the lease back from the lease-holder.
LH-update LH→CR Lease-holder gives up the lease and writes a record to the coordinator indicat-
ing the new lease-holder. The update must be signed and include a sequence
number.
LH-transfer LH→New-LH Current lease-holder transfers the lease to the new lease-holder. The transfer
must be signed and include the latest sequence number.
Replication update Device→CR A device has replicated a block-version and notifies the coordinator. The
update must be signed.
Table 1: Major protocol messages in Unity. In the participants in a message can be the lease-holder (LH), the cloud
node (CN), the coordinator (CR) or a non-lease-holder user device (Device).
request. Both the cloud node and user devices store block
contents in a key value store that is indexed by DE, block
and version number.
When another devices wishes to access a DE, they
send a lease-holder switch request to the coordinator,
which then sends a lease-holder revocation message to
the current leaseholder. The current lease-holder sends
any pending updates to the directory and then appends
a lease-holder update message to the log, which con-
tains the identity of the new leaseholder. The current
lease-holder then sends a lease-holder transfer message
directly to the new lease-holder to indicate that it has fin-
ished flushing all the state to the coordinator and is now
ready to give up the lease. Before taking on the lease, the
new lease-holder will request the state of the DE from the
coordinator and thus become aware of the latest versions
of all blocks.
With the wide availability of cellular data networks,
we expect user devices to be connected to the network
most of the time. However, in the event that a lease-
holder is not connected, Unity provides a form of dis-
connected operation similar to Coda [12]. If the lease-
holder misses a heartbeat message, then the coordinator
labels the lease-holder as disconnected. The remaining
devices will run a lease-holder recovery protocol and a
new lease-holder will be selected (described in more de-
tail Section 2.4. If the disconnected device has outstand-
ing writes when it reconnects to the cloud, it will have
to check the DE state on the coordinator if any other
writes occurred while it was disconnected. If there were,
it will have to resolve the conflicting writes. Otherwise,
it can simply make a lease-holder switch request, acquire
the lease and send its outstanding writes to the cloud
provider.
2.2 Providing durability
The system described above allows each user device
to access data stored on the cloud, but does not pro-
vide any more guarantees than current commercial cloud
providers. To provide durability in the event of a cloud
provider failure, Unity replicates user data cross the
user’s devices up to some pre-determined replication tar-
get. Furthermore, Unity guarantees that each DE can be
replicated to a consistent snapshot of its contents, simi-
lar to the prefix semantics guaranteed by Salus [22]. To
provide this guarantee, Unity must replicate in the order
they were written and must also replicate older versions
of blocks even if a newer version exists.
We enhance each write update in the DE state with a
list of devices that have replicated the block. Initially, a
newly written block will only have been replicated twice,
once by the lease-holder that wrote the block and once
by the cloud node. If the replication target is greater than
two, then other devices must also replicate the block to
achieve the desired level of durability. Other devices can
find out which blocks require replication by requesting
the state from the coordinator. These devices can then re-
quest blocks by sending block requests to the cloud node.
After a device replicates a block, it updates the coordina-
tor by sending a replication update that specifies the DE,
block index and version that the device replicated, and
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the coordinator than appends the ID of the device to the
corresponding write update in the DEs state. A simpler
implementation would only keep track of the number of
replicas for each write update, not the actual devices stor-
ing the replicas, but Unity does this to protect against a
malicious coordinator as discussed in Section 2.3.
A naı¨ve implementation would have each non-lease-
holder device try to replicate the oldest block in the state
of a DE. However, because the devices update the DE
state after they have replicated the blocks, this can re-
sult in races that cause blocks to become over-replicated.
Instead, for each DE, non-lease-holder devices locally
compute non-overlapping subsets of write updates to
replicate by hashing the outstanding blocks into a hash
space of all non-lease-holder device IDs and replicating
the blocks that collide with their device ID. An alterna-
tive would have been to perform random block replica-
tion as in RAMCloud [17], but we found that Unity de-
rived very little benefit from this approach.
Requiring the cloud node and user devices to retain
old versions of blocks indefinitely would eventually con-
sume all the storage on these machines. As a result,
nodes in Unity garbage collect blocks if there is a more
recent block that reached the replication target and that
can be used to recover user data to a consistent snap-
shot from a device or cloud failure. Determining which
blocks can be garbage collected can be done locally by
each device and the cloud node as long as they have up-
to-date information about the replication level of each
block-version, which is basically the number of currently
existing replicas and can be obtained from the coordina-
tor. A malicious coordinator could reduce durability by
lying about which the replication level, causing blocks
to be prematurely garbage collected. We will show how
Unity prevents this attack below.
2.3 Providing Security
Unity delivers confidentiality, integrity and durability for
user data despite a malicious cloud provider. Unity de-
fines a malicious cloud provider as a coordinator and/or
cloud node that does not follow the above protocol.
Unity does not differentiate between the reasons for
cloud provider misbehavior, which could be due to mali-
cious intent, operator error or software bugs.
User devices can also act maliciously due to a malware
infection or theft by a malicious individual. Unity also
protects against malicious user devices but to a lesser
extent. Unity cannot protect the confidentiality or in-
tegrity of user data since all user devices have privileges
to read and write the user’s data. For example, Unity
does not prevent a malicious user device from deleting or
overwriting the user’s data. However, Unity does ensure
that a malicious user device cannot subvert the durabil-
ity guarantees against a malicious cloud provider. Unity
limits a user device from reducing the replication level of
any block by at most one (the malicious user device it-
self). In this way, malicious user devices can do as much
harm as a failed device with respect to durability.
Unity’s guarantees are predicated on three assump-
tions. First, a malicious user device and a malicious
cloud provider do not collude. If they do, than the ma-
licious cloud provider will gain the ability to subvert
the confidentiality and integrity of the user’s data via
the malicious device, breaking the set of guarantees that
Unity places against a malicious cloud provider. Second,
we assume that devices have reasonably accurate local
clocks. This is necessary because as described below,
the lease-holder needs to know if it has missed a heart-
beat due to a device failure or a network failure. Third,
we assume a network failure model where a device is ei-
ther able to communicate with all other devices and the
cloud provider or not able to communicate with any of
them. This assumption simplifies failure detection of de-
vices.
We secure Unity by further enhancing the protocol to
deal with attacks against the confidentiality of data, the
integrity of data and the durability of data.
Confidentiality: All user devices have a shared key that
they use to encrypt and decrypt data stored on the cloud
node. The cloud provider is not aware of this key and
thus cannot read any of the data stored on the cloud node,
thus guaranteeing confidentiality. Our current implemen-
tation of Unity does not allow the cloud provider to de-
duplicate identical blocks across users. However, Unity
can also use convergent encryption [1, 20], which allows
de-duplication at the cost of some amount of privacy for
users.
Integrity of block contents: A malicious cloud provider
may attempt to modify the block contents stored on the
cloud node after it is uploaded by the lease-holder. To
prevent this, each user device has a public-private key
pair for signing where the public key half is known to
all other user devices. The lease-holder signs each write
update that contains a hash of the block contents for the
corresponding block version. All devices verify the sig-
natures of write updates received from the coordinator
and verify the contents of blocks received from the cloud
node using the hash in the corresponding write update.
Integrity of DE state: Since all write updates are signed,
a malicious coordinator cannot tamper with write up-
dates or forge new ones. However, there are still two
attacks it may perform. First, it may mount an omission
attack by dropping write updates from the DE state. Sec-
ond, as mentioned earlier, it may tamper with or forge
new replication updates to artificially increase the appar-
ent replication level of a block. This attack decreases
durability by causing the tampered block to get under-
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replicated and can cause other blocks to get prematurely
garbage collected.
We enhance each write update with a sequence num-
ber, which must be unique for each DE. Each write up-
date and lease-holder update message will have a unique,
monotonically increasing sequence number and the se-
quence number shall be large enough so that it is unlikely
to wrap (64 bits in our implementation). This not only
prevents the omission of a write update or lease-holder
update message, but also puts a well-defined order on
these events that is determined by the lease-holder that
writes the messages into the DE state. The lease-holder
is required to write an update into the state at a regular
heartbeat interval even if it has no new blocks to write, al-
lowing devices to detect if a malicious coordinator trun-
cates the log because it will not see an update for a period
that exceeds the heartbeat interval. When lease-holders
transfer the lease to another device, they flush any mes-
sages they have to the coordinator. Then, they include the
signed sequence number of the last message sent to the
coordinator in the lease-holder transfer message that is
sent directly to the new lease-holder. This short message
prevents the coordinator from showing the lease-holder
an incomplete view of the DE state and constitutes the
only inter-device communication that occurs during the
regular operation of Unity.
To prevent the coordinator from tampering with repli-
cation updates, each user device that produces the repli-
cation update must sign the update. This prevents the
coordinator from forging new replication updates, which
would cause blocks to get under-replicated or other
blocks to get garbage collected. Unity does not pre-
vent omission attacks on replication updates as there is
not strict ordering that can be imposed on these updates.
Since replication is asynchronous, even if a sequence
number were used, there could be duplicate replication
updates with the same sequence number under benign
conditions due to races. If the coordinator mounts an
omission attack on the replication update, all she would
do is causing the block to get over-replicated. While this
wastes both storage and download bandwidth for user de-
vices, this does not affect the durability of the user’s stor-
age. We do not consider this attack undesirable, because
it does not violate the guarantees Unity seeks to provide.
Summary: Unity protects against tampering and infor-
mation leakage by a malicious cloud provider using a
combination of encryption to protect confidentiality, and
digital signatures and sequence numbers to protect the
integrity of the block data and DE state. We note that
unlike typical personal cloud services, Unity does not
support sharing. While Unity could be extended to al-
low read sharing by providing other users with the en-
cryption key, or read and write sharing by also provid-
ing them with a signing key, allowing multiple users to
access the same DE may break the assumption of low
concurrency. Instead, we see Unity as complementary
to cloud services that support sharing. A user can use
Unity to store sensitive data as well as data they want to
be highly durable, and use a conventional cloud service
to store data that they want to share.
2.4 Dealing with failures
There are roughly two ways components in the Unity
cloud can fail. They can become unavailable, and either
return later or never return, or they can become mali-
cious, meaning that they act dishonestly with respect to
the Unity protocol. Unity deals with both types of fail-
ures for both the cloud provider and user devices.
Cloud provider failure: Temporary unavailability of the
cloud provider is dealt with using a standard time-out af-
ter which the temporary unavailability is treated as per-
manent unavailability. Similarly, if a cloud provider is
found to be malicious because a signature check fails or it
has omitted updates, the user devices will stop using the
cloud provider and treat it as failed. When this happens,
the user of the devices needs to associate them with a
new cloud provider. The devices initialize the new cloud
provider by combining the locally cached DE states and
then can populate the cloud node with their replicated
cloud blocks. In this case, no data is lost since the con-
tents of every block will have been replicated and the
lease-holder for each DE will have an up-to-date state
for that DE.
Unavailable user device: There are two cases for user
device unavailability – when the user device is not a
lease-holder for some DE and when the user device is
a lease-holder. The coordinator will detect device fail-
ure if the device fails to send a heartbeat message or if
the device fails to respond to a lease-holder revocation
message. If the device is not a lease-holder, the failure is
straightforward to deal with. The other devices can ver-
ify this by trying to contact the failed device directly. If
this fails, the device’s replication updates are removed,
prompting other devices may have to start re-replicating
those blocks. When the device returns, it can resend its
replication updates to the coordinator if it still has the
blocks. This is why Unity maintains a directory of which
nodes have replicated which blocks instead of just main-
taining a count.
Unavailable lease-holder: If the unavailable device is a
lease-holder, then Unity must select a new lease-holder
for the DE. However, it is absolutely critical in selecting
a new lease-holder that one and only one lease-holder
take the place of the failed lease-holder. The reason is
that having 2 leaseholders can allow a malicious coordi-
nator to obtain two different signed write updates with
the same sequence number, allowing it to fork the state
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for the DE. Ensuring this guarantee can be broken into
two sub-problems. First, the devices must ensure that the
failed device has really failed and that a malicious coor-
dinator is not claiming a failed device when the device is
still available. Not doing this check would cause another
node to become the lease-holder when the original lease-
holder still thinks it has the lease. The devices can protect
themselves against this attack by directly contacting the
current lease-holder to ensure it really has failed. If an
unavailable lease-holder returns, perhaps after recharg-
ing its battery or reconnecting to the network, it will re-
alize that it has missed a heartbeat due to having an ac-
curate local clock, and return as a non-lease-holder. It
will then have to reacquire the lease before uploading
any outstanding writes that it as.
Second, once the devices determine the current lease-
holder has failed, they must select a new one and all agree
on the new one. While this can be done with a distributed
consensus protocol like Paxos [13], Unity offers a much
simpler way to do this. Up to this point, Unity’s protocol
ensures that all devices have common prefix of the DE
state and the protocol ensures that the coordinator cannot
indefinitely truncate the DE state from devices. Thus, all
devices will eventually see the exact same lease-holder
update message in the state from the previous lease-
holder. Thus, in Unity, once devices have determined the
current lease-holder has failed, they all switch to using
the previous lease-holder as the current lease-holder. If
it turns out that has failed, they can continue going back-
wards in the state to find the previous lease-holder to that
until the find that some previous lease-holder is already
one of the ones they have tried. At this point, recovery of
the DE will require human intervention by the user.
Malicious user device: As mentioned earlier, Unity can-
not protect the confidentiality or integrity of user data
from a malicious device, but limits the impact a mali-
cious device has on durability to be the same as an un-
available device. In addition, a malicious device can gain
the lease, but must give it up if requested since failure to
respond to a lease-holder revocation message will get the
device labeled as failed. This does not necessarily im-
plicate the device because other devices cannot tell the
difference between a malicious user device and a mali-
cious cloud server, it will alert the user that something is
amiss. Finally, a malicious device may attempt to fork
the state of a DE by creating several copies of a block-
version with the same sequence number. However, since
the coordinator is responsible for distributing the write
updates to the other user device, it needs the coopera-
tion of the coordinator to carry out the fork attack. This
is why Unity’s guarantees only hold if a malicious user
device does not collude with a malicious cloud service.
Peer
Peer
Cloud
App
Unity Client 
(nbd-server)
Unity 
Daemon
File System
Block Device 
(nbd-client)
User
Kernel
Figure 1: Client Node Architecture
3 Implementation
Our Unity prototype is implemented as in two compo-
nents, a standalone coordinator, which runs as a simple
event-driven server, and a Unity daemon, called Unityd,
which runs on user devices and the cloud node. Unityd
can be specialized by the type of a client linked against
a library component of Unityd. We have implemented
three types of clients: (a) Unity Block Device (UBD),
which emulates a Linux block device, on top of which
one can mount any standard file system; (b) Unity File
system (UFS), which implements a Linux file syste‘m;
and (c) a cloud node client, which is Unityd adapted to a
cloud node. The coordinator consists of about 4K lines
of C code and Unityd consists of about 15K lines of C.
Our clients vary between 2K-3.6K lines of C code. As an
example, Figure 1 illustrates an example of a Unity de-
vice with a Unity client that implements a simple block
device for a generic file system to use.
3.1 Unityd
Unityd consists of four major components: (a) the li-
brary of API calls and callbacks that is linked with the
client; (b) the state buffer, which buffers uncommitted
DE state messages to the coordinator; (c) the block store,
which stores local copies of block contents; and (d) three
threads, which handle various events and operations in
Unityd.
As mentioned, Unityd contains three threads such as a
controller thread, a client thread and a replication thread.
A replication thread replicates blocks for durability; a
client thread handles client requests such as read or write
operations and lease-holder switching; and a controller
thread handles block requests from other devices and up-
dates to the coordinator. For more detailed explanation
about them, we refer readers to the ‘Thread’ paragraph
below in this section.
Library interface: The Unityd library exposes a sim-
ple API to the client consisting of 7 library calls and
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API Call Prototype Description
init (ul config t conf) Initialization function taking various parameters. Called before starting Uni-
tyd. Client may choose to create DEs after initialization and before starting
Unityd.
cleanup (void) Clean up function before disconnecting device from the Unity cloud.
controller start (pthread t *thread) Starts up Unityd.
controller stop (pthread t thread) Stops the Unityd. Should be used with clean to terminate
create entity (u int64 t ID,
u int64 t entity size)
Used to create a new DE of specified size and ID. The client must ensure that
it is called with a unique ID every time.
read (u int64 t ID, u int64 t
blockID, int offset, char *buf, int
size)
Reads data of specified size into buffer from offset within a particular block.
Will always read the latest version block for a particular block ID.
write (u int64 5 ID, u int64 t
blockID, int offset, char *buf, int
size)
Writes data of specified size from buffer to offset within a particular block.
This will create a new version of the block.
callback revoke lease (u int64 t
ID)
Callback function used to notify client to prepare for the lease-holder switch
for the DE specified by ID.
Table 2: API calls in Unity Library. There are two types of API calls, library calls made by the client and callback
functions called by Unityd, which the client must supply.
1 callback function that the client must provide as de-
scribed in Table 2. The first 4 API calls are only used
during starting and shutdown of the device and the re-
maining 3 calls are used for creating DEs, reading from
DEs and writing to DEs. The two callback functions
are used by Unityd to notify the client of lease-holder
switch events. The callback revoke lease call-
back is called when the client is about to lose the lease.
In general, this should cause the client to flush any writes
it is caching to Unityd so that they can be sent to the
cloud provider. The client should complete these flushes
before returning from the callback function. If the client
calls read or write on a DE it doesn’t have the lease
for, Unityd library will automatically acquire the lease
before it returns.
The client itself is responsible for assigning a unique
ID to each DE when it is created. This is because it
is unsafe for clients to trust the coordinator to do this
since malicious coordinator can return the same DE ID
for requests from two different devices in order to full
clients and obtain two different signed updates for the
same block. To ensure that clients always pick a globally
unique DE ID, we leverage a DE itself; more specifically,
the special bootstrap DE (DE ID zero in our prototype)
is used to maintain the largest used DE ID. When allo-
cating a new DE, clients atomically read and increment
the value stored in the bootstrap DE and use this value
as the ID for the new DE. Since Unity guarantees strong
consistency, all clients are always guaranteed to see the
consistent contents for the bootstrap DE.
State buffer: The state buffer stores a local copy for
the state of every DE. It also buffers new write up-
dates, lease-holder updates and replication updates gen-
erated by the device that have not been sent to the co-
ordinator yet. To store this information, an in-memory
data structure is implemented to store write updates and
lease-holder updates as a per-DE append-only log for-
mat. Each write update contains the block ID, the ver-
sion number for the block, the sequence number for the
update, the array of device IDs replicating the block, the
block content’s SHA1 hash and a 2048-bit RSA signature
of the entire update. Any replication updates are stored
with the associate write update along with their respec-
tive signatures as well. Lease-holder updates store the
sequence number and the IDs of the old and new lease-
holders, along with a RSA digital signature.
The state buffer maintains two indexes for easy search-
ing. A block-version index enables lookup by a {block,
version} tuple and a sequence number index enables
lookup by a sequence number. The block-version index
is used to obtain the hash of a block content to verify the
integrity of the block content when it is fetched from the
cloud node. For efficiency, rather than sending write or
replication updates to the coordinator right after they are
created, Unityd will batch them and send them at a fixed
interval (usually 30 or 60 seconds). The sequence num-
ber index is used to easily find all the updates that were
created since the last batch and needed to be sent to the
coordinator.
The in-memory append-only log for each DE is ac-
cessed by either the client thread or replication thread
which adds new updates to the state. Also, a controller
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thread accesses it to send new updates to the coordina-
tor. Thus, there is race between them. In order to mini-
mize contention, the state buffer uses a double buffering
scheme to allow threads to concurrently access it without
having to acquire locks.
Block store: The block store stores the block contents
that make up the DEs. It stores block contents down-
loaded from the cloud node including old block-versions
to guarantee durability. Also, it stores current block ver-
sions to service the read requests received from the local
client. The block store in our prototype is implemented
using the combination of a LevelDB key-value store and
a large linear buffer on an ext4 file system. The key used
for LevelDB is the concatenation of the 64-bit DE ID, 64-
bit block ID and then 32-bit version number. Each key
is mapped to the value that is the offset into the buffer
where the actual contents of the corresponding block-
version are stored in the file on the ext4 file system.
Threads: The replication thread reads the state buffer
and assembles a list of block-versions that require repli-
cation for each DE. Determining blocks to replicate is de-
pending on whether the replication thread is running on a
user device or on the cloud node. If it is on a user device,
it will only replicate the subset of the blocks that require
replication. As explained in Section 2, the replication
thread hashes under-replicated blocks into a hash space
consisting of the device IDs of all non-lease-holder de-
vices and begins replicating the blocks that collide with
its device ID. At the every heartbeat period, the new set
of updates is fetched from the coordinator, triggering the
replication thread to re-evaluate the set of blocks it needs
to replicate.
On the cloud node, the replication thread will always
replicate from the lease-holder and replicates every block
that requires replication. Thus, our implementation differ
slightly from the architecture described in Section 2 since
new block contents produced by writes by the lease-
holder are actually fetched from the lease-holder by the
cloud node as opposed to being pushed to the cloud node
by the lease-holder. This small change was done just to
allow code re-use between user devices and the cloud
node.
The client thread implements the functions in the li-
brary interface and is not actually a stand-alone thread.
Instead, it runs in the same thread-context as the client.
When the client calls read or write, it will check if the
device currently holds the lease for the DE. Otherwise, it
requests the lease from the coordinator and blocks the
client until the lease is transferred. Once it has the lease,
it signals the controller thread to fetch the latest state in-
formation for the DE from the coordinator and then looks
up the latest version for the block being requested. Also,
it checks if the content of the block-version is in the block
store and if not, it makes a request to the cloud node to
retrieve the block content. Once it receives the content,
it then verifies its integrity by computing a hash over the
content and comparing that with the hash in the state.
The client thread will access the state of a DE only if
the device holds the lease for that DE, while the replica-
tion thread will access the state of a DE only if the device
does not hold the lease for the DE. Thus, the accesses to
the state of a DE by the client and the replication thread
are automatically mutually exclusive.
The controller thread has three functions. The main
function of the controller thread is fetching state up-
dates from the coordinator and sending batches of up-
dates from the state buffer to the coordinator. The fre-
quency at which it does this is equivalent to the heartbeat
period of the device, which is 30 seconds for non-battery
powered devices and 60 seconds for battery powered de-
vices. The cloud node sends the heartbeat at every 10
second to minimize the delay for it to learn about new
updates. Computing the signatures for updates to send to
the cloud is deferred until the time that the batch needs to
get sent over. Meanwhile, the signatures are stripped off
once they are verified after being fetched from the coor-
dinator. Thus, no signature is stored in the state buffer of
a device. To reduce the bandwidth consumption, the con-
troller tries to fetch only updates for blocks that have not
been replicated as many times as the replication target.
Thus, it remembers the sequence number of the oldest
block that has not been fully replicated and sends this to
the coordinator when fetching updates. The coordinator
then returns all blocks with sequence numbers later than
the specified sequence number.
The second function of the controller thread is to han-
dle lease-holder switch requests. The lease request for a
DE sent to the coordinator can be rejected (NACKed) if
the coordinator is already in the middle of a lease-holder
switch for the same DE. Then, the controller will back
off and retry after some time interval has passed.
The final function of the controller thread is handling
block fetch requests from other devices. If the controller
is running on a user device, it will get requests from the
cloud node and therefore upload block updates to the
cloud. On the other hand, if the controller is running on
the cloud node, it will offer the block to the lease-holder
and handle the replication requests from other user de-
vices.
In all devices, the controller thread has the lower pri-
ority than the client thread. The consequence of this is
that the client thread’s performance is preferred to that of
the controller thread. Thus, if there is a lot of client I/O,
replication requests from the cloud node can be delayed
as the controller thread may be delayed to run. However,
this is acceptable as it actually leads to better I/O per-
formance for applications running on the device that the
user is currently actively using.
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3.2 Coordinator
The coordinator is a simple, single-threaded server that
services requests to fetch and update state information
for DEs. It uses essentially the same code used to man-
age the state buffer in Unityd except that it is unable to
sign or verify any of the signatures. As a result, a slight
modification is made to allow it to store the signatures
along with the updates. Devices fetch all updates for
a DE greater than some sequence number. To service
these requests quickly, the coordinator uses the sequence
number index to find the update from which it can start
collecting updates to put into the response.
The other function of the coordinator is to detect de-
vice failures and to inform the other devices. So, it main-
tains a table for all connected devices, which contains
their device ID, IP address, their heartbeat period and
time passed since the coordinator lastly received a mes-
sage from those devices. This table can also be fetched
by user devices.
3.3 Clients
We implement two different Unity clients to demonstrate
the flexibility of Unity prototype. The first is a Unity
Block Device (UBD) which maps a block device onto a
single large DE. Devices can mount local file systems on
UBD. However, if two devices try to concurrently access
different files on the same file system, they will need to
exchange leases, which hurts the performance. To al-
leviate this false sharing, we demonstrate the flexibility
of DEs using our second client, the Unity File System
(UFS) where each file in a file system is mapped to its
own DE. Finally, a third client is used to implement the
cloud node.
Unity Block Device: Unityd is a user-space daemon but
clients must in general have kernel component to allow
Unity to flush the kernel’s buffer cache before a lease-
holder switch. We thus build UBD on top of Network
Block Device (NBD) version 2.9.25. NBD consists of
an nbd-client, which is a kernel-level block device and
an nbd-server, which is a user-space server. We run nbd-
client and nbd-server on the same machine and use nbd-
client to capture block requests from a local file system
and send them to the user-space nbd-server. We then
modify nbd-server to translate block requests into library
calls into Unityd’s client library. The nbd-server can re-
ceive variable length requests, which UBD pads or parti-
tions as needed into 4KB block-sized requests to Unityd.
The callback revoke lease callback uses internal
kernel functions to flush the buffer cache and inode cache
of the kernel to cause all data to be written to the nbd-
client.
Unity File System: There can be cases where false shar-
ing can occur for a user. For example, she may be editing
a document on her laptop, while listening to music on her
phone. If both the document and music file are stored on
the same file system, this will result in many lease-holder
switches if the file system is simply mounted on top of
UBD. UFS deals with the case by mapping each file onto
its own DE.
UFS is built by modifying the Minix v3 file system
on Linux to maintain a mapping between file names and
DE IDs and a mapping between disk blocks and offsets
into those DEs. On each I/O request, UFS translates the
request into a request for a DE and block ID and passes
this information to the nbd-client. We also modified the
nbd-client to forward this information to the nbd-server.
Instead of using the same DE ID in all of its requests, the
UFS nbd-server then uses the proper DE ID and blockID
in its request.
The mapping between filenames, file system blocks
and DE and block offsets is maintained in a special trans-
lation DE that stores these translations. Again, different
file system operations such as file creation, deletion or
renames are all serialized through the translation DE, en-
suring consistency of the UFS name space. However, be-
cause simultaneous access to different DEs can happen in
arbitrary order, UFS provides no consistency guarantees
or restrictions on concurrent access to different files.
Cloud node: The cloud node is a trivial client that never
makes any requests and can never acquire the lease. As a
result, the cloud node always runs as a non-lease-holder
and only the replication thread is active.
4 Evaluation
We evaluate three aspects of Unity. First, we evaluate
Unity’s use of bandwidth against NFS, NBD and Drop-
box, a popular personal cloud storage service. We also
evaluate the amount of upload bandwidth usage of Unity
and compare this against its upload bandwidth if repli-
cation were done directly between devices. Second, we
measure Unity’s performance overhead versus the same
alternative and show that Unity gives comparable perfor-
mance to other cloud and network storage options. Fi-
nally, we evaluated the flexibility of DEs and how chang-
ing the mapping of DEs to storage abstractions can alle-
viate false sharing.
4.1 Evaluation Setup
In our evaluation, we use four machines to represent
a cloud node, a lease-holder user device, a non-battery
powered device and a battery-powered mobile device in
our lab environment. The cloud node and lease-holder
user device are equipped with 3.4 GHz Intel i7-3770
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CPUs and 16GB of memory. The non-battery powered
user device is a machine with a 3.4 GHz Intel i7-2600
CPU and 16GB. Finally, the mobile device is a 2GHz
AMD Dual Core Processor 3800+ with 2GB of RAM.
The coordinator is running on a virtual machine also in
our lab environment.
The heartbeat period controls the frequency at which
each of the devices sends and fetches state updates from
the coordinator. The heartbeat period is set to 10 seconds
for the cloud node, 30 seconds for the non-battery user
devices and 60 seconds for the mobile device. We use a
replication target of 3, which means that for each newly
written block during a workload, one replica will exist on
the lease-holder, another replica on the cloud node and
the final replica will be on either the non-battery powered
device or the mobile device.
We evaluate Unity with the following network config-
urations. One configuration uses an unconstrained gi-
gabit network between the 4 nodes. We also used an-
other configuration emulates a more realistic network
setup where the non-battery nodes have high-end ca-
ble modem-like connections with 32 Mbps upload band-
width and 128 Mbps download bandwidth. The mobile
node has a LTE-like connection with 16 Mbps down-
load and 8 Mbps upload. All network configurations
are emulated with a D-Link DGS-1100 Gigabit EasyS-
mart Switch, which supports the bandwidth control fea-
ture that can individually limit upstream and downstream
bandwidth on each port.
4.2 Workloads
We use three workloads in our evaluation. To repre-
sent a compute-heavy workload with a mix of reads and
writes, we compile the Emacs-24.2 editor. The compi-
lation tools are hosted on a local partition but the source
files and target directory for the compilation are stored in
Unity. For a streaming write workload we create a ran-
dom 224MBytes file on a local partition and compress it
using bzip2 onto the storage backed by Unity. Finally,
for a streaming read workload, we read the compressed
file from Unity and decompress it using bzip2 back to a
local file system. All tests are done using the UBD client,
except for the evaluation of the flexibility of DEs where
we compare the UBD client with the UFS client.
4.3 Bandwidth utilization
We study how Unity uses network bandwidth in each of
our three workloads. At the start of the workload, we
assume all blocks have been replicated three times on
the cloud node and the two non-lease-holder nodes. In
addition, the lease-holder node executing the workload
always fetches all needed blocks from the cloud node. In
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Figure 3: Streaming Read
addition, any block the lease-holder writes must be up-
loaded to the cloud node for the non-lease-holder nodes
to replication.
We found that the size of the cryptographic signatures
in our scheme incurs a significant amount of bandwidth
utilization because the size of RSA signatures is rela-
tively large compared to the size of the actual update
sent to the coordinator. Thus, we also modify Unity to
use HMAC-SHA1 (abbreviated to HMAC) which uses a
20 byte signatures, which is a lot lesser than the RSA’s
256 byte signature. While more efficient in terms of the
bandwidth consumption, we note that the drawback of
HMAC is that it is a symmetric signature scheme, mean-
ing that all user devices must now be trusted since they
all share a single signing and verification key. We also
compare these schemes to an implementation of Unity
where no digital signature scheme is used (OFF).
Figure 2, 3 and 4 show that the upload and download
bandwidth consumption for each of the devices in all
three workloads using each of the three signing schemes
(LH represents the lease-holder, D1 is the non-battery
powered devices, D2 is the mobile device and CL is the
cloud node). The graphs also show the bandwidth used
for transferring block contents and control data in the
form of state updates and lease-holder transfers. In the
compilation workload shown in Figure 2, we see that the
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cloud node spends the upload bandwidth the most, fol-
lowed by the lease-holder. The lease-holder cannot avoid
using upload bandwidth because it is writing new blocks
due the compilation and must upload them to the cloud
node. However, the two non-lease-holder nodes use al-
most no upload bandwidth as they are just downloading
the new blocks.
We see that if RSA is used, the bandwidth used by con-
trol data dominates the workload because of the increase
in the size of the update messages. When we examined
why the bandwidth usage was so high, we learned that
our original decision allowing devices to specify which
state updates they wanted to fetch from the coordinator
by specifying a sequence number for a DE was problem-
atic. Because different non-lease-holder nodes replicate
different blocks, they do not always replicate them in se-
quence. Sometimes, a block with a low sequence num-
ber might be remained as not fully replicated for some
time. With this, devices may end up with repeatedly
fetching the same update more than once. A better ap-
proach might have been to maintain timestamps for each
update and allow devices to only download updates no
older than the configured time duration.
When comparing the control data bandwidth usage be-
tween the non-battery powered device (D1) and the mo-
bile device (D2), we see the effect of the heartbeat inter-
val on the download bandwidth consumption. Because
D1 has a 30 second heartbeat period and D2 has a 60 sec-
ond heartbeat period, we see that D1 spends significantly
more download bandwidth on fetching updates than D2.
This effect is even more visible for the cloud node, which
has a 10 second heartbeat period.
In Figure 3, the streaming read workload shows much
simpler behavior. Since the workload has predominantly
read heavy, we see that the lease-holder mainly down-
loads and the cloud node mainly uploads to send the
blocks to the lease-holder. Because very few blocks are
newly written (mainly due to access time updates), D1
and D2 perform almost no replication and have very lit-
tle upload or download bandwidth usage.
Finally, for the streaming write workload in Figure 4,
we see that the usage of control bandwidth is even greater
than other cases, especially for RSA. We note that even
for the large number of blocks newly written, the lease-
holder spent very little upload bandwidth for control data
compared to the amount of bandwidth spent to download
data. This again is an artifact caused by all nodes repeat-
edly downloading the same updates.
Comparison with NFS, NBD and Dropbox: We also
compare the bandwidth consumption of Unity with NFS,
NBD and Dropbox. For NFS and NBD, all data is placed
on the server and only one client was used to run the
workload. In Dropbox, data is uploaded to the Dropbox
server from one device. When the upload is completed, a
second device where the workload would be run is con-
nected to the Dropbox service so that it can start syn-
chronizing. Because Dropbox does not fetch block data
on demand unlike NFS, NBD or Unity, we wait for Drop-
box to finish synchronizing data to the new device before
starting the workload. We enabled Dropbox’s LAN Sync
feature, which allows clients to transfer data directly to
each other if they are on the same LAN. Unity runs with
RSA signature scheme enabled.
Table 3 shows the bandwidth utilization measurement
of the workloads across the different systems and net-
work types. We note that Dropbox has very low upload
bandwidth usage on the compile workload under the un-
constrained 1Gbps network. We think the reason is the
repeated experimental run. We speculate that Dropbox
likely detects that we are trying to upload identical files
which are just uploaded recently and thus skip actual up-
loading. Unity is not as efficient as the other systems,
largely due to the control data overhead. However, in
terms of upload bandwidth, it is more efficient than other
systems, and it is only worse by a small amount for few
cases. Thus, we conclude that the price that Unity pays
for the added durability and security over single server or
existing cloud systems is acceptable.
Energy Cost Saving: Uploading consumes more power
for wireless devices than downloading. Thus, saving up-
load bandwidth consumption does not only improve per-
formance, but also saves energy. Using the data transfer
energy model studied by Huang et. al. [8], we can es-
timate the energy saving offered by Unity and compare
it against that of having the lease-holder to replicate the
block using direct peer-to-peer communication. Our pre-
vious measurement shows that the block upload band-
width usage of the compilation workload is about 122
MB. We consider three different network classes: wifi,
3G and LTE. For the replication target set to three, the
data should be uploaded at least twice. However, the
design of Unity allows it to be only uploaded once to
the cloud node, because the third replicas can be down-
loaded by other device. From this we can compute the
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Table 3: Bandwidth Consumption for Unity, NFS NBD and Dropbox in MBytes (Down/Up)
Benchmark 1G HomeCompile Sread Swrite Compile Sread Swrite
NFS 194 / 187 235 / 1 1 / 246 217 / 214 245 / 6 6 / 262
NBD 28 / 174 234 / 1 2 / 332 32 / 117 245 / 6 6 / 262
Dropbox 169 / 4 209 / 2 1 / 234 172 / 489 242 / 6 5 / 253
Unity 80 / 50 263 / 32 349 / 269 167 / 52 265 / 36 682 / 284
energy saves. We show the energy saving as the percent-
age of the whole battery capacity of a Nexus 4, which
has a 3.8 V, 2100mAh battery, equivalent to 28,728 J of
energy.
wifi 552.75 J 1.92 %
3G 2,340.61 J 8.15 %
LTE 1,129.68 J 3.93 %
Table 4: Energy savings offered by Unity in J and as a
percentage of a Nexus 4 battery.
From this we can see that Unity has the potential to
save energy for wireless devices and the gain would pro-
portionally increases as the replication target gets higher.
4.4 Performance
We record the run time overhead of Unity when execut-
ing our workloads and compare it to that of NFS, NBD
and Dropbox in Table 5. Since we have to wait for Drop-
box to synchronize all files before starting the compila-
tion, Dropbox’s performance numbers are bad because
the workload and file downloads are serialized, while
they are interleaved on the other workloads. This is the
limitation of Dropbox because it does not take the file
system activity into account when deciding what order
to synchronize files in. For the compilation workload,
Unity is generally competitive and is closest to NBD
which Unity is built based on. For the streaming write
benchmark, all operations happen locally on Unity, NFS
and Dropbox, and then are uploaded to the remote server
or cloud node after completion, hence there is very little
overhead. Only NBD uploads blocks during the stream-
ing write and suffers overhead. In the streaming read
workload, the main overhead on the fast 1Gbps network
is due to the high cost of the RSA verification done for
each block read. In addition, Unity currently does not
batch sequential block reads, thus requiring a round trip
for each read. However, this experiment demonstrates
that our unoptimized Unity prototype can still achieve
performance comparable to that of NFS, NBD and Drop-
box.
To evaluate how long Unity takes to replicate data,
we measure the average time it takes for a newly cre-
ated block-version to reach the replication target. With
a constrained network, Unity takes an average of 19.67
seconds over the 28,274 blocks written during the com-
pilation workload and RSA signing. The streaming write
takes the average delay of 100.99 seconds to replicate
the 60,811 blocks. The increased delay of the stream-
ing write results from the large number of blocks cre-
ated. Because the client thread is prioritized over the
controller thread, no block replication is done until the
workload completes. Then, the sudden surge in network
traffic as all devices try to replicate the large amount of
data causes congestion, which slows down replication.
4.5 DE Flexibility
We measure DE flexibility by comparing between the
performance using a single DE Unity Block Device
(UBD) system and the performance running the same
workload on Unity file system (UFS). As a workload,
we compress the Linux kernel using gzip, while running
Unity on different folder with from 1 to 3 devices.
From Figure 5, we can see that UBD performs ex-
tremely poorly as the number of devices simultaneously
accessing the DE increases. In many cases, we ob-
serve that the contention is so bad that a device would
barely get an I/O operation done in between lease-holder
switches. One device runs slightly faster than the others
in the single DE case. It is the device that the workload
is started on, and it signals the other devices to start their
workloads with a call to ssh. As a result, the device likely
runs exclusively on the DE for a while at starting phase
and finished faster than the other devices.
In comparison, because UFS maps each file to a
unique DE, it eliminates the false sharing and virtually all
lease-holder switches except for the specific DE storing
mapping between DE IDs to actual files. As a result, the
performance of UFS remains relatively unchanged with
the number of devices.
We also compare UFS with vanilla EXT4 on a single
node to get the baseline overhead of our file system. We
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Table 5: Performance Numbers for Unity, NFS, NBD and Dropbox in Seconds
Benchmark 1G HomeCompile Sread Swrite Compile Sread Swrite
NFS 209 31 31 349 65 34
NBD 95 33 32 124 80 54
Dropbox 1152 16 32 1155 128 32
Unity 106 64 31 110 110 31
can see that UFS itself imposes very little overhead over
a standard local file system.
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5 Related Work
There have been many existing works for securing dis-
tributed file systems in the presence of the untrusted
server component such as SUNDR, Sirius, Plutus [7,
10, 14]. To protect data security, these systems are us-
ing cryptographic techniques such as digital signature,
block checksum, encryption and decryption and so on in
a similar way Unity uses them. However, they cannot
provide availability on the server failure. Several other
works such as Farsite and OceanStore [1, 18] also deal
with Byzantine failures. However, these Byzantine fault
tolerant P2P file systems are using expensive quorum-
based protocols flooding network with broadcast mes-
sages. Moreover, most of these distributed file systems
assume multiple users, and therefore strong consistency
is not feasible be realized.
Hourglass, PDP, POR, DepSky and Hail [2, 3, 4, 9, 21]
are exploring server side solution for untrusted cloud
node issue either by applying cryptography techniques in
a novel way or by using multiple cloud service providers.
Unity is trying to make use of the opportunity provided
by the prevalent user devices. Also, Depot, Sporc and
Venus [6, 15, 19] are very closely related to Unity and
try to provide similar Security and Durability guarantees
as Unity even with untrusted cloud. However, these sys-
tems provide consistency guarantees weaker than Unity
so that conflict can still occur and do not consider band-
width efficiency much. Salus and Windows Azure [5,22]
provides a strong consistency guarantee which is similar
to Unity’s. However, they are targeting for the enterprise
environment. Therefore, they consider neither malicious
cloud server nor bandwidth efficiency.
Unity’s approach on security and durability guarantees
against the untrusted cloud and the strong consistency
model has been explored in our previous work [11]. The
work has been improved in its protocol and implemen-
tation to consider bandwidth efficiency, and more ex-
tensive evaluation studies have been added. Energy ef-
ficient storage systems on consumer electronic devices
have been studied by projects like BlueFS [16]. Unity is
different from BlueFS by providing strong consistency
guarantee through flexible DE abstraction and prefix se-
mantic.
6 Conclusion
Unity is a secure and durable personal cloud storage sys-
tem that can minimize the bandwidth consumption of
user’s devices. Unity allows users and cloud providers
to establish a new relationship for user data management
where the user devices provide durability and security
guarantees and the cloud node provide high availability.
By replicating blocks in a serialized manner, Unity can
provide strong consistency guarantee as well. Also, by
making extensive use of Cloud’s upload bandwidth in-
stead of user devices’, upload bandwidth consumption
of user devices could be used much more efficiently. Our
evaluation results show that Unity can achieve security,
durability and bandwidth efficiency at the small extra
cost to exchange control information.
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